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The global need to respond to the social, economic and humanitarian impact of anti-personnel landmines 
will soon enter its third decade. From one 
perspective, the expansion and maturity of 
the global mine-action programme appears 
dramatic and positive; yet from another, it 
may appear quite the opposite. Emergency 
mine action, designed to alleviate suffering 
and improve socioeconomic situations, is a 
critical post-conflict response. International 
and national responses, however, should also 
be aimed at addressing short- and long-term 
objectives, maximising utilisation of limited 
finances and implementing efforts quickly. 
Mine-action programmes concentrated 
initially on rapid response rather than on 
standards. This trend started to change in the 
early 1990’s with an emphasis on safety and 
quality standards. It was often accompanied 
by a resistance to addressing productivity (and 
therefore not actively addressing effective-
ness, efficiency or delivery in a timely man-
ner2). In 1997 the standards pendulum was 
initiated with the production of International 
Standards for Mine Clearance Operations;3 
this initial work was incorporated in 2001 into 
the International Mine Action Standards.
With the continuing development of the 
IMAS, the standards pendulum began to swing 
even farther to the right, concentrating solely 
on standards that emphasise and implement a 
quality and a safety regime. While the IMAS 
provide a very sound foundation for clearance 
activities, the continued development of an 
International Standards Organization-based 
system could be in danger of losing sight of the 
humanitarian perspective. Indeed, standards 
are now so important that they override the 
need to work effectively, efficiently and in a 
timely manner. 
Differing Views
We all view mine action from slightly dif-
ferent angles, though all are presently bound, in 
more ways than one, by the IMAS and the asso-
ciated plethora of supporting documentation. 
Time to Steady the Pendulum 
by Eddie Banks [ The “Ca’d’oro” ]
The author questions whether the ever-increasing emphasis on standards is diametrically opposed to principles 
of the United Nations and the International Mine Action Standards1,2 and whether the implementation of the 
IMAS restricts a humanitarian response.
The IMAS Web site is managed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining on behalf of the United 
Nations Mine Action Service, and hosted and maintained by the Mine Action Information Center. 
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The close coordination of a multitude 
of players is a difficult task. Donor organi-
sations, however, have spent more than 10 
years addressing policy, standards, advocacy 
and the fundraising role so that implement-
ing organisations (both nongovernmental and 
commercial) can provide (if rules and regu-
lations permit) operations that function effi-
ciently. If the rules, regulations or external 
factors restrict the implementing organisa-
tions, then efficient, effective and timely objec-
tives become difficult—if not impossible—to 
achieve. 
IMAS—The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
Since 1997, the concept of operating an 
ISO-styled system has become popular and 
the momentum to instigate an ever-increasing 
standards regime has been clearly identifiable. 
While many argued for standards that address 
humanitarian needs and complained of the 
increased costs and donation depletion, the 
need for comprehensive standards is unde-
niable. Yet, while comprehensive standards 
have raised standards of quality, it has become 
obvious that the IMAS have developed lives of 
their own, raising the question of whether this 
is an acceptable cost. 
While the IMAS are not actually ISO-
based, the two are now so close together that 
they are seen as one. Several mine-action cen-
tres and individual nongovernmental organ-
isations are now preparing to become ISO 
certified due to the pressure to be ahead of the 
game. Few may understand the time, effort 
and cost needed to comply and maintain an 
ISO-styled capability. It is difficult enough 
for large commercial companies and inter-
national NGOs to fully comply; it would be 
impossible for most small companies, almost 
all of them indigenous organisations. 
If a company is already operating under 
International Mine Action Standards, then 
what does ISO accreditation do for the 
company? The price is too high if it is an exercise in obtaining some 
sort of accreditation without real benefits. The question is: Are the 
revised standards now prolonging the socioeconomic and environ-
mental impact caused by mines and unexploded ordnance and creat-
ing long-term dependency? Mine action should not be learning about 
living with mines but about working toward a future without mines. 
The Critical Issues
Even if donors provide contributions quickly, there are a number of 
issues in the context of the IMAS that need to be addressed in order to 
utilise donations effectively. These include:
• Defining effective, efficient and delivered in a timely manner
• Acceptance of the productivity issue
• Creating a balanced response
• Interpreting the standards and guidelines in a pragmatic and 
flexible manner
• Modifying the IMAS to take a more humanitarian perspective
Effective, efficient and timely. The United Nations, by the utilisa-
tion of the IMAS, has attempted to create a safety and quality founda-
tion that should provide the tools for programmes and projects to assure 
they are conducted effectively and efficiently and are able to be delivered 
promptly. However, if by the use of the IMAS, humanitarian-demining 
costs increase or they slow the humanitarian-demining process, then the 
IMAS could only be identified as ineffective and inefficient. Operating 
efficiently does not necessarily mean effectively, and being effective does 
not automatically mean operating efficiently. Delivered in a timely man-
ner is a meaningless phrase; 
it is too general and cannot 
be measured. 
The IMAS are about 
standards that can be 
measured, so productivity 
data (operational speeds) 
as guidelines for outputs 
provide something that 
is measurable. The IMAS 
should be a guideline to 
monitor quality control on-site, or a basis for assessing site work (by 
use of daily reports) when no on-site inspectors are available. Maybe 
the statement  should be something with more meaning, such as 
“operating to defined safety and quality standards and to known pro-
ductivity outputs.”
The productivity issue. The three key elements of most contracts are:
1. Performance completed to a certain standard (safety and quality)
2. Work conducted within an agreed budget or contract cost 
3. Execution of the task within the contractual time
The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre spent months 
assessing a productivity table, taking into account the variety of factors 
that affect productivity. While this process may not be considered per-
fect, BHMAC at least accepted that productivity was a critical issue. 
Commercial companies, regardless of their function, have to address 
productivity on every task to conduct project management and work-
activity tables, and to plot daily progress. The IMAS make no reference 
to work productivity or any phrase closely associated with it, so how do 
the United Nations and the authors of the IMAS determine that a task 
has been achieved in a timely manner? 
The emphasis on safety and quality alone has resulted in an envi-
ronment where actual work output is reduced to a nonessential item. 
This situation results only in increasing longevity and costs. Standards 
and guidelines cannot address all on-site situations; therefore, common 
sense, guided by the standards and guidelines, and site-specific risk 
assessments, are essential requirements. 
The inclusion of risk assessment4 in a 2006 study by the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining is one of the most 
progressive and lateral-thinking concepts to come from the establish-
ment for some time—but beware of the dragon. Risk assessment needs 
a complete understanding of the site and technological limitations. 
Undertaken correctly, risk assessment can reduce time and effort, and 
therefore costs, but assessments undertaken in the uncertainty of an 
operational site can sometimes go wrong. In mine and unexploded 
ordnance contracts, the penalty for being wrong may be treated with 
undue harshness. 
Balanced response. A balanced response should maintain the 
equilibrium among mine-risk education, mine-victim assistance, 
information technology, training, research and development, and 
mine and UXO clearance. The IMAS presently control all of these to 
some degree. 
Few will argue against the need for standards, but some may 
argue that the present interpretation of the IMAS by many makes the 
standards far too restrictive. For example, a newly formed NGO is 
measured at the same level (standards) as an international NGO or sea-
soned commercial company. The current IMAS do not allow for these 
variations in capability (standards) and therefore limit the chances of 
newly emerging, indigenous organisations—the very ones we should 
be encouraging.
 Modifying the IMAS to take a more humanitarian perspec-
tive. Most of the land on which work has been undertaken before the 
IMAS were established has been accepted as cleared and returned to 
its owners, so former 
standards of work must 
have achieved an accept-
able standard of output. 
Standards, moreover, 
must address real needs, 
so unless the IMAS can 
provide an effective QA/
QC framework, they have 
failed. 
While other indus-
tries, none of which have a major humanitarian element, demand 
error-free standards, the depletion of donor funds from a decreasing 
humanitarian budget makes unrealistic standards hard to justify from 
a humanitarian perspective. Standards need to be tailored to meet three 
basic requirements in present-day mine action:
1. Humanitarian: Humanitarian standards must exist to achieve 
safety, quality and productivity but must not curtail—by time, 
effort or cost restrictions—the humanitarian response. 
2. Commercial: Commercial standards should be based on the 
same format and basic principles as humanitarian standards, 
but the commercial clients must be able to select additional 
work standards to achieve a level of confidence for which they 
are willing to pay. In many cases, IMAS rules and regulations 
meet this requirement. 
3. Health, safety and environmental: Finally, there are those com-
panies that seek an even higher level of confidence based on 
stringent HSE requirements. This standard may mean not using 
mechanical equipment if they think that it could cause environ-
mental damage to delicate soil layers or flora and fauna—not 
something normally considered on humanitarian mine-action 
sites. 
In their present form, the IMAS fall somewhere between humani-
tarian and commercial requirements. Serious thought needs to be given 
to the development of a tiered system or to amending the text to allow a 
selection process based on project needs. 
“Standards are necessary for any 
mine-action activity, but standards 
must reflect actual need.” 
1
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The Financial Implications 
Standards cost money. They are expensive 
to write and maintain; they cost considerably 
more to implement. Little information has 
been provided since the initial writing of the 
IMAS about their real costs. Certainly there 
are some commercial contracts for which the 
cost of IMAS implementation is significantly 
higher than for other contracts.5
As standards become increasingly strin-
gent, there will be a correspondingly greater 
cost to implement those standards. While 
commercial clients may be able to bear this 
additional cost, the financial cost for humani-
tarian work can reduce a donation’s effective-
ness. Real cost in this situation is measured in 
prolonging socioeconomic hardship through 
additional injuries and deaths, and in further 
delays in improving conditions for those we 
are supposed to assist.
Summary
Standards are necessary for any mine-
action activity, but standards must ref lect 
actual need. The authors of the IMAS must 
also balance humanitarian with commer-
cial needs, and they must ensure that this 
intention is not subject to different inter-
pretations. Currently, evidence suggests a 
widespread lack of understanding on how to 
interpret the IMAS—this could point to fail-
ure of the standards. 
As less money is available, standards could 
be blamed for prolonging the period that many 
communities have to coexist with mines. If 
this is the case, then maybe standards will be 
responsible for making the term humanitarian 
mine action an oxymoron. It is time to carry 
out mine action in a more (cost) effective, effi-
cient and timely manner. 
See Endnotes, page 110
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The Biblical parable of the two sons1 illustrates a great human dilemma often repeated in literature and life. 
It is a very simple story: One son responds to 
his father’s request to work in the vineyard 
by declining, yet reconsiders his intention 
and in the end does his father’s bidding. The 
other son, keen to appear obedient, accepts 
the responsibility, but decides against doing 
the work. The question of who has done the 
father’s will answers itself. 
This parable reminds me of the state of the 
Ottawa Convention.2  Four years ago in this 
column, I commented about the undoubted 
success and shortcomings of the Anti-personnel 
Mine Ban Convention.3 Those observations 
are, I believe, still true. The more timely issue, 
however, is implied by the very nature of the 
Convention itself. Is the Convention providing 
guidance that induces practitioners to do 
good, or does it provide a forum where officials 
simply make meaningless conversation and so 
become a clanging cymbal?4 
Let us review how the “sons,” who said that 
they were going to uphold the Convention, are 
doing. There is at least one signatory, Venezuela, 
still making active use of its emplaced anti-
personnel landmines, even while making state-
ments at meetings that it is fully committed to 
the Convention. To my knowledge, no State 
Party has questioned Venezuela’s noncompli-
ant behavior, leaving only the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines to condemn the 
action, calling it “highly disturbing.”5
Regarding mines retained for training 
(Article 3), the Landmine Monitor reports that 
“there is a clear history of little or no consump-
tion [destruction] of retained mines by a sig-
nificant number of States Parties.”6 Eighteen 
countries have not reported destroying any 
landmines since ratifying the Convention, 
while 15 more of those with remaining stock-
piles have not reported destroying APLs for 
two or more years.6
Clearance is the focal point of mine 
action; the Convention requires that 10 years 
after accession, mine clearance must be com-
plete. At the meetings of the States Parties in 
Amman, Jordan, in November 2007, heavy 
emphasis was put on this requirement. Yet, 
it appears that at least 14 states will not 
meet their 2009 deadlines, with four fail-
ing to commence clearance operations at 
all.6 Indeed most of the discussion during 
the clearance portion of the meeting dealt 
with procedures for requesting extensions for 
clearance operations.
The Parable of the Two Sons
by Dennis Barlow [ Mine Action Information Center ]
In spite of the overwhelming good being 
accomplished by the Ottawa Convention 
ban on anti-personnel landmines, there are 
indications that actual accomplishments and 
adherence to its tenets are sometimes ignored 
in favor of rhetoric. Worse is the tendency of 
other signatories to turn a blind eye to these 
shortfalls, not wishing to be accused of being 
negative toward fellow States Parties.
The “other sons” (in this case, nonsig-
natories) have acted variously. Countries 
that decided not to ban APLs via the Ottawa 
Convention are not intrinsically evil. They 
felt that they had a larger responsibility in 
defending their allies (e.g., the United States), 
believed chronic border problems necessitated 
APL reliance (e.g., Finland), or they placed a 
greater emphasis and reliability on more tra-
ditional arms-control venues (e.g., India).
It may surprise some to learn that the 
United States has adhered to the spirit of the 
Ottawa Convention since it was signed by the 
first States Parties and whose last significant 
use of APLs took place in the 1991 Gulf War 
in order to defend Saudi Arabia, the same year 
of  the entry into force of the Convention. The 
United States also has, beginning in 1988, 
developed an  extensive program of humani-
tarian mine-action programs, exercised lead-
ership of the Mine Action Support Group, 
managed a robust mine-detection and clear-
ance research and development program, 
and has destroyed well over  3.3 million of its 
stockpiled landmines.7 
Most of the 30 nonsignatories have 
endorsed the concept of elimination of 
APLs and 19 attended the Eighth Meeting 
of States Parties in Jordan. Most have also 
endorsed nontransfer or moratorium actions. 
Many countries that are not parties to the 
Convention have been taking steps toward it, 
such as cessation of production and export. 
If one were to assess the use of APLs today, 
it is generally not states who are the culprits, 
but factions, insurgents, drug lords, criminals 
and terrorists.
A review of national mine action glob-
ally reveals some interesting, if predictable, 
conclusions. Since the early 1990s, virtually 
every government and country has come to 
understand the insidious nature of APLs. 
Some countries could quickly sign the Ottawa 
Convention because they had no landmines, 
were not disposed to use landmines, or were so 
impressed by the need to ban landmines that 
they decided to override whatever military 
necessity APLs rendered—or perhaps they 
signed because the political climate provided 
them an altruistic persona.
The difference between these two sets of 
countries—signatories and nonsignatories— 
has been overblown; Finland and Norway, 
the United States and Canada, and Turkey 
and India are more alike in this regard than 
they are different. All but the most roguish of 
states desire to see the end of indiscriminate 
APL use. The time has come for the global 
mine-action community to accept all who 
wish to see the humanitarian impact of land-
mines—as well as other explosive remnants of 
war—eliminated.8 The efforts that go into uni-
versalization and the finger-pointing it often 
engenders not only sap the energy and unity 
that could be focused on clearing landmines 
and ERW, but worse, that creates holier-than-
thou attitude that leads to words rather than 
actions, recriminations rather than results, 
and isolation rather than inclusion. 
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Mine Ban Enters into Force in Jordan
Following a royal decree, the 2008 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban became an official part of Jordanian law. 
The Kingdom of Jordan, which signed the Ottawa Convention banning the use of landmines in 1998, 
has been working to eradicate landmines and other explosive remnants of war since that time. The 
new law represents a deepening of the government’s commitment to addressing the landmine problem 
in the kingdom.
States Parties to the Ottawa Convention are obliged to make consistent progress toward eliminating 
the threat posed by landmines, and Jordan has been pursuing this goal since signing the Convention. 
The government of Jordan created the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation in 2000 
to direct policy for and supervise mine-action activities. The NCDR is chaired by HRH Prince Mired 
and directs management and regulatory activities, as well as coordinating mine-action programs and 
supervising the implementation of best policies and procedures.
The 2008 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban now provides national legal punishments for anyone emplacing 
AP mines in Jordan as well as anyone trading, developing, possessing or handling mines in other 
ways. There are also punishments for anyone aiding or abetting any of these prohibited actions. 
Exceptions to these regulations are provided to approved government parties actively involved in 
landmine eradication—most notable are members of the Jordanian Armed Forces who use mines in explo-
sive ordnance disposal training exercises.
Those found guilty of violating the statutes of the new law are subject to steep fines, imprisonment 
and hard labor. Additionally, anyone who provides information to authorities on illegal activities 
can receive legal protection for his/her assistance.
The new law also establishes the NCDR as the lead mine-action coordinating and supervising agency 
in the country. The NCDR is now officially responsible for working with the armed forces and outside 
agencies to ensure successful collaboration. The 2008 AP Mine Ban also gives the NCDR the authority 
to make requests of international organizations for information as well as assistance with equip-
ment and training.
Although it has made remarkable progress in addressing the landmine situation within and along its 
borders, Jordan anticipates that its original deadline for landmine clearance by May 2009, as dic-
tated by the Convention, may need to be extended to 2011.  
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